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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
E. PAUL THOMPSON, 
Plaintiff-Re8pondent, 
vs. 
THE CITY OF CENTERVILLE, 
a Municipal Corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10562 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by the respondent, a taxpayer, 
against the City of Centerville, pursuant to the Declara-
tory Judgments Act (Rule 57, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and Chapter 33, Title 78, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953). 
Herein the plaintiff asked the court to restrain 
the appellant from conducting a bond election in accord-
ance with the procedures set forth in the Utah Municipal 
1 
BondAct, i.e., Chapter 41, Laws of Utah, 1965 (Chapter 
14 of Title 11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953). The plain-
tiff asked the court to rule on the constitutionality of 
certain provisions of the Utah :Municipal Bond Act, to-
wit: Section 11-14-5 and 11-14-6, Utah Code Annotat-
ed, 1953 (Sections 6 and 7 of Chapter 41, Laws of Utah, 
1965) as it related to the procedure to be followed by 
the municipality in conducting a bond election. 
DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT 
The relief prayed for in plaintiff's complaint wa5 
granted by restraining the holding of the bond election 
and finding that a portion of the statute was uncon· 
stitutional: 
The portion of section 11-14-5, Utah Codi 
Annotated, 1953 (section 6, Utah Municipal 
Bond Act, chapter 41, Laws of Utah, 19651 
which extends the definition of a "taxpayer" to 
include the spouse of one paying taxes is un· 
constitutional and beyond the power of the legis· 
lature. 
The district court upheld the constitutionality oi 
the remaining portions of Sections 11-14-5 and 11-1 H, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Defendants appealed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants seek reversal of the judgment J'l 
straining the holding of the bond election. 
2 
STATElVIENT OF FACTS 
The city council of the City of Centerville, the 
appellants, adopted a resolution providing for the hold-
ing of a special election in Centerville City for the pur-
pose of submitting to the qualified taxpaying electors 
thereof the question of the issuance of general obligation 
bonds. The resolution followed the provisions of the 
Utah lVlunicipal Bond Act, supra. The resolution pro-
vided that a special election be held submitting the 
matter of the authorization of the general obligation 
bonds to such qualified electors of the city as shall have 
paid a property tax in the year preceding the election. 
(Record p. 6.) 
The resolution, m pursuance of Section 11-14-5, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provided that: 
" ... all qualified electors of the city who shall 
have paid a property tax therein in the year pre-
ceding such election shall be entitled to vote at 
such election." 
and specified that the following instructions be used in 
determining voters' qualifications: 
" (a) A qualified elector shall be deemed to have 
paid the required property tax in the city if he 
owns any property therein, title to which is held 
in his name, and he has pt\id any tax thereon dur-
ing the twelve months preceding the election. 
" ( b) The spouse of any person mentioned in 
sub-paragraph (a) shall be deemed to have paid 
such property tax. 
3 
" ( c) A qualified elector shall be deemed to 
have paid the required property tax in the city 
if he has contracted to purchase any real prop-
erty therein and pursuant to the terms of such 
contract shall have supplied money which has 
been applied to the payment of taxes on such 
property during the twelve months preceding 
the election. 
" ( d) A person whose name appears on the offi-
cial tax rolls of the county as having paid a tax 
on property in the city during the twelve-month 
period immediately preceding the election, shall 
prima facie be considered to have paid the prop-
erty tax required to qualify him to vote in the 
election." (Record p. 9.) 
The resolution, pursuant to the provisions of Sec-
tion 11-14-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, then specified: 
the manner in which the qualifications of each qualified, 
elector offering to vote as a taxpayer within the above·, 
stated definitions would be established by providing: 
" ... his status as a taxpayer shall be challenged 
by one of the election officials (or may be chal· 
lenged by any other persgn) at the time the bal· 
lot is applied for and he shall be given a ballot 
and be permitted to vote if he is shown on the 
registration lists as a registered voter in the city 
and if he signs an oath sworn to before one of 
the election officials that he is a qualified elector 
of such city and has paid a property tax therein 
in the 12 months preceding the election." (Rec· 
ord p. 9). 
The plaintiff, by his complaint, brought this action 
to prevent the conducting of the election asserting that 
4 
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these provisions of the Utah lHunicipal Bond Act were 
violative of Article XI Y, Section 3 of the Constitution 
of the State of Utah in that the legislature, by enacting 
the statutory sections relating to the qualifications of 
voters reduced the standards fixed by the Constitution 
and thereby extended the privilege of voting to persons 
not constitutionally authorized so to do. 
AllGU.MENT 
Point I 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION. 
THE LIGISLATURE BY ENACTING THE SECTIONS 
:c- OF THE UTAH MUNICIPAL BOND ACT RELATING TO 
ed QUALIFICATIONS OF VOTERS DID NOT REDUCE THE 
ed, STANDARDS FIXED BY SECTION 3 OF ARTICLE XIV OF 
'e- THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND DID 
NOT EXTEND THE PRIVILEGE OF VOTING TO PERSONS 
NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY AUTHORIZED SO TO DO. ed I 
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By means of its resolution, the City of Centerville 
sought to authorize and conduct an election for the 
purpose of authorizing the issuance of general obligation 
bonds of the city for the purpose of constructing a 
reservoir and extensions to the culinary water system. 
(Record p. 6). 
It followed the procedures established by the Utah 
Municipal Bond Act, supra, which was enacted by the 
1965 session of the Utah legislature. This act, among 
other things, seeks to implement and interpret the pro-
5 
visions of Section 3 of Article XIV of the Constitution 
of the State of Utah which reads as follows: 
"No debt in excess of the taxes for the current 
year shall be created by any county or subdivi· 
sion thereof, or by any school district therein, 
or by any city, town or village, or any subdi-
vision. tl:Jereof in this State; unless the proposi-
tion to create such debt, shall have been submitted 
to a vote of such qualified electors as shall have 
paid a property tax therein, in the year preceding 
such election, and a majority of those voting 
thereon shall have voted in favor of incurring 
such debt." (Emphasis supplied). 
The italicized portion of the above-quoted Section 
3 is the part of the section with which we are concerned 
in this proceeding. 
The legislature, in Section 6 of the Utah Municipal' 
Bond Act, describes for the guidance of the election 
officials who should be deemed to be "such qualified' 
electors as shall have paid a property tax therein." , 
Section 6 of the Utah Municipal Bond Act read~ 
as follows: 
"The words (qualified electors of the muni~i· 
pality as shall have paid a property tax therern 
in the year preceding such election, as used 
herein shall have the same meaning as do the 
same words appearing in Section 3 of Article 
XIV of the Utah Constitution. Subject to any 
contrary interpretation thereof which may here· 
after be made by final decision of a court of corn· 
petent jurisdiction, election officials conducting 
b<l_nd elections and county officials whose dut: 
6 
it may be to supply records to such election offi-
eials for use in determining voters' qualifications 
shall interpret the aforesaid words in the light 
of the following instructions: 
" (a) A qualified elector shall be deemed to have 
paid the required property tax in the munici-
pality or other entity so proposing to issue the 
bonds if he owns any property therein, title to 
which is held in his name, and he has paid any 
tax thereon during the twelve months preceding 
the election. 
" ( b) The spouse of any person mentioned in 
subparagraph (a) shall be deemed to have paid 
a property tax. 
" ( c) A qualified elector shall be deemed to have 
paid the required property tax in the munici-
pality or other entity so proposing to issue the 
bonds if he has contracted to purchase any real 
property therein and pursuant to the terms of 
such contract shall have supplied money which 
has been applied to the payment of taxes on 
such property during the twelve months preced-
ing the election. 
"A person whose name appears on the official 
tax rolls of the cpunty or counties in which the 
municipality or entity is located as having paid 
a tax on property in the municipality or entity 
during the twelve-months period immediately 
preceding the bond election shall prima facie be 
considered to have paid the property tax re-
quired to qualify him to vote in the election." 
The legislature described in a portion ofSection 
6 of the Utah :Municipal Bond Act the manner in 
which the election officials could determine whether 
7 
or not any proposed voter constituted a "qualified 
elector of the municipality as shall have paid a prop-
erty tax therein in the year preceding such election" 
by adopting the following language, comprising a part 
of Section 11-14-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953: 
"Prior to a bond election, the registration lists 
to be used may be checked against the tax rolls 
of such county or counties and the names of the 
electors shown on the registration lists who ap-' 
pear after sych checking to have so paid such 
property tax may be indicated in some conveni-
ent manner on the registration lists and such 
indication shall also be prima f acie evidence of 
the status of the elector as a property taxpayer,: 
but the failure so to mark the registration lists i 
shall not be considered an irregularity or ground ' 
for invalidating the bond election. A person 
applying for a ballot at any bond election whose I 
qualifications to vote are challenged by any one~ 
or more of the election officials or by any other 
person at the time the ballot is applied for shall 
receive a ballot and be permitted to vote if (I) 
such person is shown on the registration lists 
as a registered voter in the municipality or 
other entity calling the bond election, and (2) 
such person signs an oath sworn to before one 
of the election officials that he is a qualified 
elector of such municipality or entity and has 
paid a property tax tperein in the year preceding 
the bond election." 
The constitutional question before the court is 
whether or not the sections of the Utah Municipal 
Bond Act relating to qualifications of voters is an at-
tempt upon the part of the legislature to reduce the 
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standards fixed by the Constitution for the exercise 
of the elective franchise and by this means to extend 
the privilege of voting to persons not otherwise con-
stitutionally authorized to do so. (Roberts v. Spray, 
223 P.2d, 808, 819 (Ariz. 1950), and Bethune v. Salt 
River Valley Water Users' Assn., 227 P. 989, 992 
(Ariz. 1924). 
The general rule of law widely recognized, is that 
a state legislature, under its conceded power to regulate 
and administer the election process, may neither prevent 
those constitutionally qualified from voting nor permit 
those not constitutionally qualified to vote: 
See: 18 American Jurisprudence, Elections 
§ 51 p. 213 and the cases cited there, especially: 
People v. English, 
29 N. E. 678, 680, (Ill. 1892) 
S cown v. Czarnecki, 
106 N. E. 276, 283 (Ill. 1914) 
Tolbert v. Long, 
67 S. E. 826, 828 (Ga. 1910) 
It is also the generally accepted rule that constitu-
tions are to b~ liberally construed in order that they 
might meet and be a pp lied to new conditions and cir-
cumstances as they arise in the course of progress of the 
community. (16 Am. Jur. 2d, page 234, § 61 and §62.) 
At § 61, 16 Am. Jur. 2d, page 234, has this 
to say: 
"A constitution usually announces certain basic 
principles to serve as the perpetual foundation 
9 
of the state. It is not intended to be a limitation 
on the State's healthful development nor a11 
obstruction to its progress. Accordingly, the 
courts are not inclined to adopt such a technical 
or strained construction is will unduly impair the 
efficiency of the legislature to meet responsi· 
bilities occasioned by changing conditions of 
society. It is proper to as~ume that a constitution 
is intended to meet and be applied to new con· 
ditions and circumstances as they may arise in 
the course of the progress of the community.' 
The courts in this country have shown a deter· 
mina ti on to give our written constitutions, by. 
interpretation, such flexibility as will bring them 
into accord with what the courts believe to be 
public interest. 
"There is a definite obligation of law to progres1 
which should not be ignored in the interpreta· 
tion of constitutions. Their terms and provisiom • 
are being constantly expanded and enlarged by• 
construction to meet the advancing and improv· 
ing affairs of men. The United States Supreme 
Court has said that the scope of the 'vague, un· ! 
definable, admonitory provisions of the Constitu· 
tion' is inevitably addressed to changing circum-
stances. 
( Y akus v. United States, 321 US 414, 88 Law· 
yers' Edition 834; Ullman v. United States, 
350 US 422, 100 Lawyers' Edition 511; Parkin· 
son v. Watson, 4 Utah 2d 191, 291 P 2d 400)." 
This rule of construction takes into consideration 
the facts that constitutions are broader in their scope 
than statutes. They are original and unlimited and arr 
in effect for a longer period of time. Their amendment 
is usually cumbersome. 
10 
Accordingly, the objectives of constitutional pro-
visions rather than the form of expression must be 
regarded. 
16 American Jurisprudence 2d 239, §63 states: 
"The practical construction of a constitution 
is to be followed, in order that effect may be 
given the purpose of its provisions. The estab-
lished practical construction of a constitutional 
provision should not be disregarded unless the 
terms of the provision f urinsh clear and definite 
support for a contrary construction ... 
"A constitution, viewed as a continuously op-
erative charter of government, is not to be inter-
preted as demanding the impossible or the im-
practicable. 
(Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 US 81, 
87 Lawyers' Edition 1774)." 
Appellant submits that the legislature merely 
sought, by the enactment of the Utah lVIunicipal Bond 
Act and in particular of the sections in question, to 
assist the political subdivisions and their election officials 
to implement the constitutional provision and that the 
enactment of Sections 11-14-5 and 11-14-6, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, did not expand the constitutionally-
qualified electors. 
Point 2 
THE LEGISLATURE HAS THE PO"TER 
AND RESPONSIBILITY TO HELP ELEC-
11 
TION OFFICIALS I.MPLEl\IENT THE CON-
STITUTION AL PROVISION. 
Sections 11-14-5 and 11-14-G, Ctah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, merely provide a method or procedure for 
ascertaining whether a person who presents himself 
to vote is qualified to vote. 
It is generally recognized that the legislature has 
1 
I 
the power and responsibility to help election officials i 
implement constitutional provisions as to voter qualifi- I 
cations. 
The l\laryland courts refer to this as the power . 
to enact rules of evidence: I 
1 
"The constitution itself merely designates the · 
qualifications, and then leaves the legislature free : 
to declare by what evidence those qualifications · 
must be shown to exist. It is perfectly competent ' 
for the legislature to say what shall and what 
shall not be admissible evidence to pron a par-
ticular fact; ... " (Southerland v. Norr~, 22 
A. 137,l\ld. 1891). 
"There the legislature has exercised this power and 
spoken the effect giYen that legislation by the courts is 
not always uniform. .Although numberless cases could 
be cited to demonstrate that registration provisions are 
directory or mandatory or even unconstitutional, as 
attempting to impose additional qualifications to those 
prm·ided by the constitution for voting, the following 
cases graphically illustrate the courts' attitudes: 
In Henderson t'. Gladish. 128 S.,V. 2d 257 (Ark 
12 
; 'i 
i 
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I I 
I 
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1939) the Arkansas general assembly had provided that 
poll tax receipts, which had to be presented to election 
officials before an elector could be allowed to vote, had 
to be written with pen and ink. The court held that the 
yotes were not rendered illegal because the poll tax 
receipts had been written through carbon paper. In so 
holding the court stated that: 
" ... the lawmaking body did not have power to 
prohibit election officers from receiving other evi-
dence that the tax had been paid .... The offi-
cers possess a discretion in receiving or rejecting 
evidence other than pen-and-ink-written receipts, 
and if they should reject insubstantial evidence, 
that discretion would not be abused." 
Wendover v. Tobin, 261 S.vV. 434 (Tex. 1924) is 
to the same effect where the court construed a city 
charter as merely providing 
" ... for the officers of the election a method or 
methods by which it can be ascertained whether 
the voter has paid taxes on property in the city . 
. . . The Legislature has no power or authority 
to require other qualifications than those, for 
voting, provided in the Constitution ... The char-
ter does not seek to deny the right to vote if the 
name of the voter does not appear on the assess-
ment roll, nor if he fails to produce a r~ceipt or 
make an affidavit, or if the officer fails to write 
'sworn' thereon." 
An attempt to carry the doctrine of election offi-
cials' discretion to its logical extreme was rejected in 
State v. Board of Canvassers, 68 S.E. 676 (So. Carolina 
13 
1910). The legislature had provided that persons seek-
ing to vote had to produce a registration certificate and 
"proof of payment" of all taxes. The election officials 
in some cases did not require both and in others neither. 
An attempt was made to show compliance with the law 
by proving that the managers knew the voters person-
ally, and were satisfied that they had registration certif· 
icates; and that they had paid their taxes. Although the 
court did not deem it necessary to decide "just what 
proof of payment of taxes, other than the certificate or 
receipt ... which is made conclusive proof thereof, will 
satisfy the statute," it did hold that at least the legis· 
lature meant by the word "proof": 
" ... legal and competent evidence, furnished 
by affidavit or in some other legal form, and such 
as would satisfy a reasonable mind of the truth." 
To be contrasted with this last case is Henry v. 
Oklahoma City, 108 P.2d 148 (Okla. 1940). The Okla· 
homa legislature enacted a statute which defined the 
state constitutional language "a qualified property tax 
paying voter," to be "any qualified elector ... who has 
actually paid taxes on property . . . , and who has a 
legal tax receipt therefor dated within twelve months 
prior to such election." In some cases election officials 
permitted persons to vote upon affidavit of their quali· 
fications rather than requiring the evidence of a legol 
tax receipt. The court upheld this procedure saying: 
"The Legislature may enact legislation to aid 
the election officials to decide who is a 'qualified 
taxpaying Yoter,' but in the final analysis, it 1' 
14 
the eJection officials who must decide what proof 
convmces them of the fact, and their decision 
should be exercised reasonably so as not to dis-
franchise a voter." 
Point 3 
THE PROCEDURE PROVIDED BY SEC-
TION 11-14-6, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953, TO PERMIT A "CHALLENGED" VOTER 
TO VOTE IF HE IS ON THE REGISTRA-
TION LIST AND "SIGNS" AN OATH S'V"ORN 
TO BEFORE ONE OF THE ELECTION OF-
FICIALS THAT HE IS A QUALIFIED ELEC-
TOR IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
In enacting Section 11-14-6, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, the legislature recognized the many prac-
tical problems with which municipalities, school dis-
tricts, counties, and other districts in Utah were con-
fronted when seeking to establish voter qualification 
by means of matching registration lists with the taxa-
tion rolls of the county. In some instances involving 
special districts such as occurred in the Hamilton case 
(Eldred R. Hamilton et al v. Salt Lake County Sewer-
arJe Improvement District No. 1, 15 Utah 2d 216, 390 
P.2d 235, 1964), the county officials in charge of the 
tax or assessment rolls were unable to segregate the 
persons residing within the special district involved. 
In some instances even though the most recent tax or 
assessment rolls were supplied to officials in charge 
of the rolls, the names of the persons appearmg as 
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the taxpayers on the rolls differed from the manner 
in which the name appeared on the registration rolls, 
e.g., initials preceding the last name of the taxpayer 
and the name and one initial used for the same taxpayer 
on the registration rolls. In instances where tax receipts 
were attempted to be used, this same problem would 
become apparent, i.e., variations in the names and ini-
tials used by the same person to list himself as a tax· f 
payer on the rolls as compared to the manner in which I 
he listed himself in the registration rolls. · 
Similarly, a wife could be deprived of her right 
to vote even though her name appeared on the tax rolls 
as well as the registration rolls because the name of 
her husband did not properly appear on the tax rolls 
so as to coincide with the manner in which his name 
appeared on the registration rolls. (See Stipulation -
Testimony of J. Lambert Gibson, Record p. 17.) 
As a practical matter also, in the large communities 
and counties sheer numbers of population made cross· 
checking between tax rolls and registration lists virtu· 
ally impossible during the day of the election. 
A statutory provision such as that of Section 11· 
14-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which permits per· 
sons to vote upon an affidavit of their qualification is 
the only practicable means whereby constitutional right 
to vote of a large segment of our populace can be pre· 
served and implemented. 
The use of the affidavits of qualification is not new 
in Utah. It has been the practice for many years for 
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the practical reasons above referred to. The statute 
merely recognizes and formalizes what has been neces-
sarily followed throughout the state. 
In numerous jurisdictions the courts of last resort 
haYe considered the question of whether the reliance of 
election judges on affidavits is sufficient and have up-
held this practice despite the fact that there was no 
express legislative permission. 
In Henry v. Oklahoma City, 108 P.2d 148 (Okla-
homa 1940), a constitutional provision limiting the fran-
chise in bond elections to "qualified property tax paying 
voters" was further defined by statute to mean qualified 
electors paying taxes and having legal tax receipts 
therefor dated within 12 months prior to election. On 
the facts of the case it appeared that persons were 
allowed to vote in a city bond election who did not 
possess such tax receipts but who furnished affidavits 
that they were qualified taxpaying voters in the county 
in which the city was located. The court conceded that 
such affidavits were defective because not limited to the 
city in question, but held that plaintiff had not overcome 
the presumption of legality attaching to the votes once 
they had been cast and counted. The opinion of the 
court contains the following language at pages 152 to 
155: 
"'Ve are of the opinion that until the Legis-
lature may otherwise provide, the election offi-
cials are justified in accepting from prospective 
electors affidavits of their eligibility to vote .... 
YVe cannot presume that the election officials 
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relied upon the [defective] affidavits as the only 
means of establishing eligibility to vote. Tl;e 
presumption is they properly performed their 
duties. 
" ... We again quote from the opinion of 
Logan v. Young, supra, as follows: 
"There is also a well-established rule of law 
that public officials are presumed to do their i 
d t " ' u y ... 
In Morgan v. Board of Suvervisors, 192 P.2d 236 
(Ariz. 1948), in which the facts were closely similar to 
those appertaining in the Henry case except for the 
question of infirmities in the affidavits used, the court 
held at page 241: 
" ... We believe that the action of the board 
requiring each person, before voting, to certify 
that he was a real property taxpayer, or to pre· I 
sent a current tax receipt, was not an unreason· , 
able requirement but rather conformed with the 
spirit of the general election laws relative to the 
registration of voters." 
Clearly, if the election officials provide an affidavit 
procedure to determine whether a person is a "qualified 
taxpaying voter" without legislative permission, the 
legislature can provide for such a procedure and numer· 
ous cases have so held : 
State v. County of Dade, 125 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 
1960) 
State v. Old, 34 S.W. 690, 693 (Tenn. 1896) 
Fitzmaurice v. Willis, 127 N.W. 95, 98 (N.D. 
1910) 
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The affidavit procedure for ascertaining whether 
a particular voter possesses the required qualifications 
is carefully discussed in the often-cited case Appeal of 
Cusick, 20 A. 574, 576-77 (Pa. 1890). The court noted 
that an affidavit is: 
" ... intended to prevent fraud, and to this end 
it probes the conscience of the voter by requiring 
him to state such specific facts as to enable the 
truth of his affidavit to be tested, and the proper 
punishment imposed upon him if it is false .... 
Without such particularity, the affidavit is not 
of any use for any purpose." 
The court held that although the Statute creating 
the affidavit procedure by which qualification of un-
registered voters was to be determined provided for an 
adequate affidavit and did not alter constitutional re-
quirements but rather safeguarded them and the integ-
rity of the ballot; the affidavit in question did not com-
ply with the statute and was too loose and vague to 
protect the purity of the ballot. 
See also State ex rel. O'Neill v. Trask, II5 
N.,iV. 823 (Wis. 1908) 
Although the affidavit procedure is a competent 
method for determining voter qualification when such 
affidavits are sufficiently specific to provide a basis for 
prosecution for perjury, in an election contest the Ari-
zona Supreme Court has asserted that the law is well 
settled that statements in affidavits of registration as 
to the registrant's place of residence are not conclusive 
of the fact, although strong evidence is customarily 
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needed to disprove the statements. Kauzlarich v. Board, 
278 P.2d 888, 891 (Ariz. 1955). 
Similarly the California Supreme Court has observed iu 
dictum that a statute providing an oath: 
" ... prescribes a smmnary mode of determining 
whether the vote shall be received, and does not 
determine its legality for any other purpose, else 
one who had ·willfully, and for a fraudulent pur-
pose, sworn falsely, would thereby become in 
effect a legal voter, and no contest against one 
elected by such votes could possibly succeed. 
There is no provision of the statute giving the 
oath any other effect than that of determining 
the duty of the board to receive the vote." Fall-
trick v. Sullivan, 51 P. 947, 949 (Cal. 1898) 
Thus, it is clear that the affidavit procedure pro-
vided for in the Utah l\Iunicipal Bond Act, (Utah Code 
Annot ated, 1953) 11-14-6 is constitutional. It does 
not add to or alter the constitutional requirements. 
l\Ioreover, the procedure is an adequate means of 
insuring and safeguarding the limitation that only elec-
tors qualified to vote exercise that right because it re-
quires sufficient specificity to provide for prosecution 
for perjury. 
In the Hamilton case, supra, the court was pre-
sented with a situation where, under the resolution of 
the entity calling the election, there was a requirement 
that the election officials be supplied with a certified list 
of the names of the registered voters residing in the 
district. EYen though no statute required such a list 
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to be made available, where the plaintiffs contesting 
the election were able to demonstrate that persons whose 
names did not appear on the tax rolls voted, it was held 
by the court that even though such persons signed a 
voter's oath, there was no substantial compliance with 
the provisions of the statutes under which the election 
was to be called and voters' qualifications determined and 
that no machinery had been set up by the authority 
calling the election under which the election officials 
could actually determine voters' qualifications. As has 
been previously pointed out, after the decision in the 
Hamilton case, supra, the legislature at its next regular 
session adopted the Utah Municipal Bond Act, supra, 
and provided, among other things, in Section 8 of the 
act (Section 11-14-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953) 
that registration lists, or copies thereof, listing all regis-
tered electors entitled to use each voting place must be 
made available at each voting place established for the 
bond election, and in Section 7 of the Act (Section 11-
14-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953) that prior to a bond 
election the registration lists so made available may be 
checked against the tax rolls and the names of the 
electors who paid a property tax marked in some con-
venient manner on the registration lists. The legis-
lature provided, however, that the failure so to mark 
the registration lists is not a ground for invalidating 
a bond election. The legislature further adopted the 
rule set forth in the H mnilton case, supra, to the effect 
that a registered voter whose name appears on the 
official tax roll as having paid a tax on property within 
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the boundaries of the entity calling the election is prima 
facie considered to be a qualified elector for bond elec-
tion purposes. 
The Utah Municipal Bond Act, supra, further pro-
vides in Section 7 (Section 11-14-6, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953,) that any person who offers to vote at a 
bond election may be challenged by any one or more 
of the election officials, or by any other person, at 
the time a ballot is applied for and may be permitted 
to vote if such person is listed on the registration list 
as a registered voter in the entity calling the election 
and if such person signs an oath, properly sworn to be-
fore one of the election officials, that he is a qualified 
elector of the entity calling the election and has paid a 
property tax in such entity in the year preceding the 
election. Under Sections 7 and 10 of the Utah Municipal 
Bond Act (Sections 11-14-6 and 11-14-9, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953), election judges are given specific 
authority to administer such oaths, authority which 
the court in the Harnilton case, supra, found wanting. 
The act provides a method for the election officials to 
record the challenges and, when the returns of the 
election are forwarded to the authority calling the 
election, the number of votes which were cast by chal-
lenged voters must be kept track of separately, although 
such votes must be considered as valid and legally cast, 
unless a court in a bond election contest shall find other-
wise. The legislature requires that no bond election be 
held invalid on the ground unqualified persons par-
ticipated, unless the point is established by clear and 
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convincing evidence in an election contest filed pur-
suant to Section 13 of the Utah Municipal Bond Act 
(Section 11-14-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,) with-
in forty days after the returns of the election are can-
vassed. 
The City of Centerville in calling the election here 
under attack provided simply that the registration lists 
showing the registered voters in the city should be fur-
nished to the election officials. The resolution (Record 
p. 9) further provided that each person whose name 
appeared on the registration list offering to vote would 
be challenged, but would be permitted to vote upon 
signing an oath sworn to before one of the election 
officials certifying that he was a qualified elector of the 
city and had paid the required property tax in the 
year preceding the election. It was not contemplated 
to furnish the election officials conducting the election 
with copies of the official tax roll or any other material, 
other than the registration lists and the oaths, in order 
to enable the election officials to establish the taxpaying 
qualifications of persons seeking to vote at the election. 
The trial court held that the procedure which was con-
templated to be used was constitutional and that the 
provisions of the Utah Municipal Bond Act, supra, 
dealing with this subject are constitutional. 
As pointed out elsewhere in this brief, it is sub-
mitted that an election otherwise validly and legally 
conducted is not void on the ground taxpaying qualif-
ications were determined solely by resort to voter's oaths 
in the manner permitted by the U tab Municipal Bond 
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Act, supra. It is submitted that the legislature of the 
State of Utah has by the enactment of the Utah .Munic-
ipal Bond Act, supra, given its approval to the use of 
voter's oaths and has provided a method whereby enti-
ties calling bond elections may provide for the use of 
voter's oaths. It is further submitted that the voter's 
0ath contemplated by the Centerville resolution to be 
used at the election is in conformance with all statutory 
and constitutional requirements and is proper for use i 
in bond elections in the State of Utah. 
If voter's oaths are used at a bond election the 
legislature has created a presumption that the election 
has been validly conducted and that unless an election 
contest is brought challenging the determination of the 
qualification of voters, or any other question concerning 
the conduct of the election, within the time prescribed 
by Section 13 of the Utah Municipal Bond Act, supra, 
Section 11-14-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953), no 
person may raise such questions in attacking the 
validity of the election or the validity of the bond issue 
authorized at the election. It is requested that as pre-
viously demonstrated this court should uphold as con-
stitutional such procedure and the provisions of the 
Utah lVlunicipal Bond Act, supra. 
If this court should decide that a bond election 
at which persons voted as contemplated by the City of 
Centerville is improper and void, then it is respectfully 
requested that the various entities in the State of Utah 
seeking to hold bond elections be advised by the court 
as to which method or methods of determining taxpaying 
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qualifications will satisfy the constitutional reqmre-
ments. If resort to voter's oaths may not be had, the 
alternatives might be: (I) to require that election offi-
cials at bond elections must be supplied with a copy 
of the official tax roll of the county and must find the 
name of any person offering to vote on that tax list 
before permitting the voter to vote; ( 2) to require the 
procedure set forth in the Utah Municipal Bond Act, 
supra, permitting the tax rolls to be checked against the 
registration lists to be followed at every bond election; 
or ( 3) to require each prospective voter before being 
permitted to vote to establish that he has paid a tax 
in the required territory during the prescribed time by 
the production of a proper tax receipt. 
From the stipulation submitted to the trial court 
in this cause (Record p. 16) it is apparent that, as a 
practical matter, it is extremely difficult for entities 
calling a bond election to provide election officials with 
accurate and complete information as to who is or who 
is not a taxpayer. It is highly impracticable to think 
that the only way this problem can be solved is to require 
the prospective voter to provide evidence of the payment 
of a tax. This is simply not a workable arrangement, as 
it would be very difficult to make certain that persons 
seeking to vote would bring the correct material to the 
polls and, as a matter of public policy, it is doubted that 
the courts should put such restrictive limitations on the 
right to vote at a bond election. It also appears that the 
solution in each case will not be to require the entity 
calling the election to supply the election officials with 
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a definitive list of the taxpaying electors residing within 
the precinct entitled to vote at the polling place, either 
by supplying a copy of the tax list or comparing the 
registration lists with the tax list and marking the 
names of taxpayers on the registration lists. Comparing 
the registration list with the tax list is a costly and 
time-consuming task, especially in the metropolitan 
areas. Furnishing the tax lists themselves of ten provides 
complications simply because of the facts, as demon-
strated in the stipulation, that ownership often appears 
in a different form on the tax roll than the voters' names 
appear on the registration lists. Also complicating the 
problems are contract purchasers and spouses whid1 
make possible delays and confusion at the polls in check-
ing the names on the tax lists. The legislature by en-
acting the Utah Municipal Bond Act, supra, has pro-
vided a workable way to avoid the problem raised in the 
Hamilton case, supra, where the boundaries of the entity 
calling the election bisect or are different than the 
boundaries of the election precincts, and it has attempted 
to solve the problems of determining taxpaying qualifi-
cations at bond elections in a manner consistent with the 
pertinent constitutional provisions as demonstrated in 
this brief. It is submitted that in order to facilitate the 
orderly conduct of bond elections in this state, this court 
should hold that bond elections are not invalid merely 
because voters' qualifications were determined through 
reference to affidavits or oaths sworn to by persons 
seeking to vote in the manner provided by Section 7 
of the Utah Municipal Bond Act, supra, after a chal-
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lenge as provided in that act, and that unless it is dem-
onstrated in an election contest, brought within the time 
permitted by the Utah Municipal Bond Act, supra, 
that enough unqualified persons voted to have changed 
the result of the election, no one may challenge the 
validity of the bonds nor the validity of the election 
after the statutory period for the election contest shall 
have expired. This rule, if adopted by the court, will not 
prevent entities from providing election officials with 
lists of taxpayers as authorized by the Utah Municipal 
llond Act, supra, but such election officials should be 
permitted to accept affidavits or oaths from persons 
seeking to vote and the same presumptions with respect 
to such votes should be accorded to such elections after 
the expiration of the election contest period. 
Point 4 
SECTION 11-14-5, UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED, 1953, MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY 
PROVIDE THAT THE SPOUSE OF A PER-
SON PA YING TAX E S ON PROPERTY 
SHALL BE DEEMED TO HA VE PAID A 
PROPERTY TAX AND THEREFORE MAY 
VOTE. 
As has been indicated above, the legislature can 
not constitutionally enlarge the provisions of Section 
3 of Article XIV so as to give a power to vote to a per-
son who does not constitute one who has paid a property 
tax. 
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The "spouse provision" in Section 6 of the Utah 
Municipal Bond Act can be read two ways: If it is 
so construed as to provide that the spouse of a qualified 
taxpayer can vote, whether or not the spouse in his 
own right meets the constitutional requirement of hav-
ing "paid a property tax," it is clearly unconstitutional 
The legislature cannot wholly disregard the constitu-
tional requirements in determining as an administrative 
matter who shall be permitted to vote. 
On the other hand the constitutional phrase "shall 
have paid a property tax" is not so unambiguous as to 
be decisive in all situations. Although interpreting a 
constitutional term in its application to specific facts is 
a judicial and not a legislative function, any legislation 
regulating the conduct of electors must make some 
assumptions about the interpretation of constitutional 
language. The present statute can be viewed as a dec-
laration that the existence of the constitutional qualifica-
tions may be shown to exist by certain evidence. Thus, 
the legislature has told the election judges that the fact 
that a person presenting himself to vote is the spouse 
of a person owning property in the municipality and 
paying a tax therein is sufficient evidence that that 
person himself meets the constitutional qualifications of 
having "paid a tax on property." 
The judicial construction placed on the constitu-
tional requirement of taxpayer status seldom makes the 
evidence of in whose name the property is assessed nor 
evidence of who in fact has paid the tax nor even the 
legal title, determinative. 
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See Setterlun v. Keene, 87 P. 763 (Ore. 1906) 
See Saller v. C.I.R., 122 F.2d 430, 432 
( C.A.A. pa.) 
See JVelfare Federation of Cleveland v. Glan-
der, 64 N.E.2d 813, 823 (Ohio 1945) 
See Johnson v. Young, 287 P. 688, 689 (Idaho, 
1930) 
Rather the courts seem to use one or a combination of 
these factors to determine who will actually bear the 
burden of an increased tax which is the issue to be voted 
upon. 
In Morgan v. Board of Sup'rs, 192 P.2d 236, 243 
(Ariz. 1948), the court in holding that veterans and 
widows who were exempted from taxes were properly 
not permitted to vote on questions to be submitted to 
vote of real property "taxpayers" stated: 
"We do not believe it was the intention of the 
framers of the Constitution to permit those who 
did not bear the "burden of taxation" to be heard 
on the question of whether a bonded indebted-
ness should be incurred." 
Thus, in State v. Menengali, 270 S.W. 101 (Mo. 
1925) the court held that a wife met the requirement 
that school directors must be resident "taxpayers," 
although the personal property which she owned was 
listed and assessed in her husban.d's name and the taxes 
thereon had been paid by the husband. 
A case quite similar in principle though not involv-
ing a husband and wife situation is City of Pocatello 
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v. Murray, 130 P. 383 (Idaho 1913) where the court 
held that although property stood in the name of 011 , 
to whom it was assessed and who pai<l the taxes there-
on, another who established that he was a joint owner 
and had paid the tax on his half interest was held to be ! 
a "taxpayer." See also: Ralls v. Sharp's Admr, 131 
s.,v. 998, 1000. ') 
J ft/-;: 2 c 3 /)!u~' )1u ,i 
In Baca v. Village of Belen/)the Supreme Court of 
New .Mexico held that wife whose husband paid the tax 
assessed on community property met the constitutional 
requirement that persons voting on question of creating 
debt be "such qualified electors ... as have paid a 
property tax therein during the preceding year." The f 
court went into a lengthy discussion of the payment I 
of taxes by an agent and treated husband and wife in 
a community property state as each other's agents and \ 
therefore both were entitled to vote. The court also noted I 
that it was "immaterial whether such community prop- \ 
erty stands assessed on the tax records in the name of 
the husband or wife, or both .... " But where none of 
these three factors was present the husbands of women 
who owned property in the district on which they (the 
women) were assessed and paid the tax were not "tax· 
payers" within the meaning of the Kentucky statutes, 
(Tate v. Board of Trustees, 49 S.,V. 337 (Ky. 1899). 
I 
In Henry v. Oklahoma City, 108 P.2d 148 (O~la. 
1 
1940) an action was brought to have a bond electwn 
declared illegal on the ground that a sufficient number 
of votes to change the result of the election were ca~! 
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by persons not legally qualified to vote in the election. 
The Oklahoma Constitution provided that only "quali-
fied property tax paying voters" should be entitled to 
vote on bond issues. The Oklahoma legislature had 
enacted a statute which expressly defined a "qualified 
tax paying voter" to be "any qualified elector under the 
Coustitution and laws of the State of Oklahoma, who 
has actually paid taxes on property within such city 
or town, and who has a legal tax receipt therefor dated 
within twelve months prior to such election." (Thus, 
the legislature was in effect declaring that a "tax receipt" 
would be sufficient evidence of qualification.) 
From the record it appeared that several classes 
of voters did not actually possess a tax receipt and ex-
hibit it to the election officials as a prerequisite to vote. 
The court described these classes of voters: 
"In some cases one of the spouses held joint 
property in his or her name; in other cases, al-
though the property was held jointly, one had 
paid the taxes with joint funds, but held the tax 
receipt in one name; in other cases the voters had 
paid taxes on their property through some agency 
that held the receipts .... 
"In all of these cases the trial judge ruled that 
such voters were fully qualified to vote within 
the meaning of the statute, and we think right-
fully so. Those voters had receipts within the 
meaning of the statute ... " (Emphasis added.) 
The case can be read as holding that where one 
spouse holds joint property in his name or one has paid 
taxes on property jointly held with joint funds, both are 
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within the constitutional term "property tax paymg 
voters." 
See also Henley v. Elmore County, 242 P.2d 85j, 
857 (Idaho, 1952), where a complaint seeking a decla-
tory judgment that the proposition submitted at a 
special bond election had been defeated was challenged 
on appeal on the ground that the term "taxpayers" 
as used in the amended complaint, as persons qualified 
to vote, did not include or specify the wife or husband 
of a taxpayer, which wife or husband would be entitled 
to vote under the Idaho Statutes. The court held that 
the word "taxpayer" as used in the complaint included 
a husband or wife of a taxpayer and therefore the com· 1 
plaint was sufficient. 
Appellant submits that the decision of the district 
court finding this portion of Section 11-14-5, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, is unconstitutional and beyond the 
power of the legislature is in error. 
Point 5 
SECTION 11-14-5, UTAH CODE ANNO· 
TATED, 1953, :MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY 
PROVIDE THAT A CONTRACT PURCHAS· 
ER SHALL BE DEEMED TO BE A PERSON 
'VHO HAS PAID A PROPERTY TAX AND 
THEREFORE MAY VOTE. 
The legislature, in providing for a recognition of 
the contract purchaser as a person who is paying a prop· 
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erty tax, recognizes that basically the purpose of Section 
3 of Article XIV of the Constitution is to give the power 
to create the bond obligation to the person who will 
be paying the tax required to repay the obligation. It 
recognizes, too, that in our modern day economy a sub-
stantial number of householders and businesses are ac-
quiring their property by means of sales contracts 
wherein they develop substantial equity in the property 
before title is conveyed. It is generally the rule that 
when the property is being sold pursuant to a condi-
tional sales contract, the purchaser is required to pay the 
taxes. 
Accordingly, the voting power of a substantial 
number of electors is involved. 
The following cases have dealt with the problem 
and have come to the following conclusions: 
In Junker v. Glendale Union High School District, 
236 P.2d 1010, lOll (Ariz. 1951), the court upheld 
the right of the contract purchaser to vote even though 
title to the property was retained by the seller. The 
court stated: 
"The issue is not without difficulty, and hav-
ing made a thorough search of the authorities 
cited by both sides as well as an independent 
search we fail to find a case directly in point .... 
. . . In the instant case the purchasers under 
the contracts are the ones who as a matter of fact 
are subject to the taxes and really paying them. 
It is true that bare legal title is still in the 
vendors, which they hold merely as a security 
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device, and in trust for the vendees. The vendees I 
of a specifically enforceable contract are the equi · 
table owners and as such have been held to be the 
real owners . ... 
" ... The vendee is the only person eligible u11- I 
der the constitutional provision and should bear- · 
corded this privilege [to vote} whether the prop- ' 
erty is assessed to him or not, as he is primarily 
affected by the results. He is the one who mn;t 
pay the additional taxes and bear the burden of 
the lien thus created." 
In Fugate v. Mayor and City Council of Buffalo, 1, 
348 P.2d 76 (\Vyo. 1960), the applicable statute pro· 
vided that the person who votes must be the owner of 
property which is assessed on the assessment rolls. The 
court did not consider the question at length, but the 
following aspects of its opinion are pertinent, at pages 
78, 79 and 82: 
" ... After a pretrial conference had been held. 
the parties herein entered into a stipulation of 
facts, which in substance is as follows: 
" . . . Three persons were the vendees under 
a recorded contract for a warranty deed and the 
property covered by such contract was assessed 
in the names of the vendors and the vendees ... · 
" ... So we think that the persons who were 
actually owners of property at the time of th~ 
election according to the agreed statement of 
facts should be considered to be legal voters." 
See also the opinion of the Supreme Court of J\fichi· 
gan in Goldsmith v. Albion Public Schools, 129 N.W. 
2d 377 (Mich. 1964) on this general question. 
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Although it is said that the right to purchase real 
estate under a contract does not constitute one the owner 
thereof ( 18 Am. J ur., Elections, § 71, 226; 95 
ALR 1099; People v. Milan, 5 P.2d 239,) State v. 
City of Rochester, 109 N.W. 2d 44 (Minn. 1961), is a 
well-reasoned opinion to the contrary. There the question 
was the right to petition for the annexation of land. The 
court's reasoning is the same as that expressed in Junker 
v. Glendale Union High School District, supra, and 
Morgan v. Board of Sup'rs, supra: 
Looking at the result of an annexation, it 
seems apparent to us that it is the vendee and not 
the vendor who will be affected by it .... 
Point 6 
IT IS CONSTITUTIONAL FOR THE 
LEGISLATURE TO PROVIDE THAT AN 
ELECTOR CAN VOTE IF HE HAS PAID 
A PROPERTY TAX DURING THE 
TWELVE MONTHS PRECEDING THE 
ELECTION ~THEN THE CONSTITUTION 
PROVIDES "IN THE YEAR PRECEDING 
THE ELECTION." 
Appellant has heretofore in this brief called the 
attention of the court to the fact that the legislature has 
a responsibility to help the election officers implement 
the constitutional provision. It has also urged that a 
constitution is to be liberally construed in order to in-
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sure that the constitutional rights or privileges are en-
joyed by the citizens of the community entitled thereto. 
Section 3 of Article XIV of the Utah Consti-
1 
tution extends the franchise to such qualified elector; 1 
1 
as "shall have paid a property tax therein in the year 
1
. 
preceding such election." The term "year" is not an ' 
absolute term. It can readily mean a "calendar year,"! 
or it can mean just as readily a period of 12 calendar . 
months. The Constitution seeks to give the franchise i 
to vote upon the matter of incurring indebtedness 
to those who will be faced with the taxes necessary 
to make repayment. The legislature, in giving con- . 
sideration to a proper interpretation of the Consti- i 
tutional intent must have given consideration to the I 
fact that those who last made payment of taxes in all 
probability will be those who will be on hand to pay the 
taxes incurred in the future to pay the indebtedness. 
Certainly an individual who has divested himself of 
the property during a current calendar year was not 
the individual that either the constitutional convention 
or the legislature believed should exercise the franchise 
for purposes of determining the future tax obligations 
imposed upon the property. 
'Vhich is the broader interpretation? The term 
"preceding year" means the preceding "calendar year" 
or it means the "preceding twelve month period." A 
few examples will readily illustrate that "the preceding 
calendar year" will divest current payers of taxes of a 
right to participate in the bond vote. 
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11- Suppose a bond election occurs in December of 
tu. 1965, and let us su:r;>pose that an owner of real property 
newly acquired it in the fall of 1965 with the result that 
ti- . 
1 he actually paid taxes in November, 1965. If we follow 
n the interpretation that "the year preceding such election" 
ar as used in the Constitution means the "calendar year 
lll ,, preceding such election," then the taxpayer in our 
example would not be qualified to participate in the 
lI' vote, yet common sense tells us that in all likelihood he 
;e 
will be the landowner and taxpayer who will be con-
1s fronted with the taxes necessary to repay the bonds 
y in the succeeding years and in all likelihood would be 
l· 
the one having the greatest concern in the outcome of 
l· the bond election. On the other hand, such an interpreta-
tion would give the franchise solely to the person who 
II 
sold the property in the fall of 1965 and, who, thereafter, 
paid no tax upon it and has no active interest therein. 
The interpretation that the legislature gave to the 
term "year" is more liberal when it provides that it 
means the "twelve months preceding the election." 
As a second example, let us suppose that a bond 
, election is held in February of 1965. Either interpreta-
tion of the term "year preceding the election" would 
give the franchise to a payer of taxes upon real property 
who paid during the month of November of 1964, but 
if that taxpayer was late in making payment and didn't 
pay it until January 10, 1965, and happened to acquire 
the property sometime during 1964, he would be dis-
qualified from participating in the election unless the 
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preceding year was interpreted to refer to the preceri r 
ing twelve-month period . 
. Moreover, were we referring to a payer of taxe 
upon personal property, a February election woulr~ 
occur prior to the time during which many of our aulrr 
mobile taxpayers pay their taxes and even prior to tlir. 
time when many of our business enterprises pay their 
inventory taxes. In such case the term 'if interpreteJ 
as meaning preceding "calendar year," would excludei 
current personal property taxpayer who paid subst· 
quent to January 1, of 1965. 
The use of the term "preceding year" as meaning 
the preceding calendar year would create more inequi 
ties than the use of the meaning "twelve preceding 
months" and would defeat the prime purpose of the 
constitutional provision to submit the matter of voting 
upon the proposition of creating a debt to taxpayen 
who will have a direct concern in the repayment of tht 
indebtedness. 
CONCLUSION 
The provisions of Sections 11-14-5 and 11-IH 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as adopted in the Utali 
Municipal Bond Act, properly implement the prori· 
sions of Section 3 of Article XIV of the Constitution 
of the State of Utah. They are not unconstitutional 
extensions of the voting power to nonqualified indi· 
viduals, but represent a necessary and proper exer· 
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'eri eise by the legislature of the State of Utah of its obliga-
tion to assist election officers to implement and under-
stand the constitutional provisions as to voter qualifica-
xe· 
ti on. ulr~ 
1!11 Appellant submits that the judgment of the district 
tlir. eourt finding that that portion of Section 11-14-5, Utah 
1e11 Code Annotated, 1953 (Section 6, Chapter 41, Laws of 
teJ Utah, 1965), which extends the definition of a taxpayer 
ei to include the spouse of one paying taxes is unconstitu-
rst· tional and beyond the power of the legislature is in 
error and that accordingly the judgment of the district 
court making the restraining order prohibiting the con-
nu 
c duct of the bond election permanent should be reversed. 
Ul 
Il~ 
the 
no c 
en 
:ht 
·6, 
al1 
\'I· 
on 
ial 
ii-
;J" 
Respectfully submitted, 
A.M.FERRO 
Attorney for Appellant 
414 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
39 
